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1. Introduction
This paper studies optimal fiscal policy in a model of firm entry and financial frictions. We
first develop a general equilibrium model with procyclical firm entry and a countercyclical
firm default rate.1 Next, we provide analytical expressions for optimal fiscal policy and
show that the government faces two trade-offs. The first arises from a profit destruction
and a consumer surplus effect when firm entry is endogenous. The second arises because
financial frictions reduce firm entry and default is costly. We then study the optimal mix
of taxes on labor-income and firm profits in a quantitative version of the model. We find
that a countercyclical labor-income tax is always part of the optimal fiscal policy, whereas
the cyclicality of the profit tax is sensitive to the source of aggregate fluctuations.
The general equilibrium model we develop features a continuum of firms subject to id-
iosyncratic demand shocks. Each firm produces a differentiated good and competes in a
monopolistically competitive market. Firms face a technological constraint when transfer-
ring resources to households that provide labor services and factor payments are financed
by working capital loans provided by financial intermediaries with an imperfect monitoring
technology.2 In this environment, firms that produce goods with a relatively low level of ex-
post demand default and firm entry and exit are jointly determined. Financial frictions thus
alter the macroeconomic effects of shocks to firm-level volatility and aggregate productivity
through the response of firm entry.3
1Lee and Mukoyama (2015) find that the firm entry rate is more cyclical than the exit rate (based on
US manufacturing data). Giesecke et al. (2011) report that the value-weighted default rate for US non-
financial firms rises in recessions. Historical default rates, such as those published by Moody’s, and which
use issuer-weighted default rates, show the same pattern. See Exhibit 5 in Ou et al. (2011).
2The financial frictions in our model differ from Bernanke et al. (1999) in that firms are monopoly
suppliers of a differentiated good. Imperfect monitoring also interacts with the working capital constraint,
similar to Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
3It is well-established that firm entry plays an important role in influencing aggregate fluctuations. For
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Consider the implications of an increase in the volatility of firm-level shocks for the produc-
tion decision of an individual firm.4 When volatility rises, the firm attempts to take advan-
tage of a potentially good realization of demand by hiring labor and expanding production.
It is optimal for the firm to do this because the market is monopolistically competitive and
there is uncertainty with respect to the price at which a firm can sell it’s good.5 Expanding
production, however, amounts to committing to a greater level of borrowing, in advance, and
increased borrowing requires each firm to generate more revenue to avoid default. As the
volatility of firm-level shocks rises, so does the minimum (default-threshold) level of demand
required for an individual firm to be able to repay its loan. Increasing firm-level volatility
therefore leads to a rise in the rate of firm default.
New firms are created each period by paying a one-time cost and firms enter until their
expected profit, conditional on not defaulting, is sufficient to cover the cost of entry. An in-
crease in volatility affects the firm entry decision through two off-setting channels. A greater
level of borrowing and an increased probability of default lead to a drop firm entry, whereas
the possibility of increased profit, via a good realization of the demand, encourages entry.6
The default channel generated by financial frictions dominates, and in equilibrium, an in-
crease in the volatility of firm-level shocks leads to an economy with fewer, more indebted
firms, alongside lower aggregate employment and a lower wage rate.
We begin by analyzing optimal fiscal policy when lump-sum taxation is available and show
example, Gourio et al. (2016) show that reduced firm entry leads to persistent negative effects on GDP.
4Our analytical results focus on exogenous movements in the volatility of idiosyncratic (firm-level) shocks.
Our approach is supported by the DSGE and VAR-based evidence in Christiano et al. (2014) and Caldara
et al. (2016) respectively. Also see the discussion in Bloom et al. (2011).
5This is a direct consequence of uncertainty over the idiosyncratic level of demand. The effect of price
uncertainty on factor inputs, for a competitive firm, is analysed in, for example, Sandmo (1971) and Hartman
(1972). What matters for our analysis is that revenue (profit) is concave in prices.
6There is a parallel between firm entry in our model and the decision to serve a second market once an
entry decision has been made. See Garetto and Fillat (2015).
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that the government faces two trade-offs.7 The first stems from changes in profit per-firm
(a profit destruction effect) and in product variety (a consumer surplus effect) when firm
entry is endogenous. This is the firm entry trade-off. Without financial frictions, firm
entry should be subsidized because the profit destruction effect is relatively weaker than the
consumer surplus effect.8 The second trade-off is a direct consequence of financial frictions
- the financial frictions trade-off. In this case, a subsidy should be used to mitigate the
reduction in firm entry associated with financial frictions but taxation is required to offset
for the resource implications of firm default. Overall, the strength of taxation is determined
by the costs of firm default and firm creation.
The financial-frictions trade-off we identify is captured by a single statistic: the endogenous
default-threshold level of demand. This also determines the aggregate default rate in the
economy. We relate optimal fiscal policy to this statistic and show analytically how the
taxation of firm profits should react to movements in the volatility of firm-level shocks. Our
main result is that the taxation of profits should be pro-cyclical when default is sufficiently
costly. An increase in the volatility of firm-level shocks causes a recession in which firm entry
falls and the default-threshold level of demand and firm default rate rise. Raising taxes is
optimal because, if the government subsidizes firms in an attempt to mitigate the impact of
financial frictions on firm entry, the resource costs associated with default increase.9
We extend the baseline model to a dynamic setting and undertake a quantitative analysis
with firm-level volatility and aggregate productivity shocks. In the calibrated version of the
model, a positive one-time one-standard-deviation shock to the firm-level volatility generates
7In the analytical version of our model we abstract from the public finance aspects of optimal fiscal policy
we consider in the quantitative analysis.
8This result is an artifact of the specification of entry costs and the form of preferences. It is not central
to the results we derive for optimal stabilization policy.
9In our model defaults cause deadweight losses to society. Glover (2016) shows that the average firm
expects to lose just under half of its value in default.
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a 0.19 percentage point rise in the default rate on impact. We compare the response of the
default rate in this volatility-induced recession to a recession induced by a negative one-
standard-deviation shock to aggregate productivity. We find that the initial increase in
default is larger (at 0.59 percentage points) and is less persistent. The differential response
of default across recessions is to due to the transmission mechanism of shocks. A persistent
increase in volatility encourages firms to expand and take on more debt, whereas a persistent
drop in productivity, only operates - in a quantitative sense - through it’s unanticipated
component.10
We then revisit the results on fiscal policy and study the optimal mix of taxes on labor-income
and firm profits when the government issues state-contingent real debt. Consistent with the
analytical results, we find that taxes on firm profits should rise in a recession if movements in
volatility are the source of aggregate fluctuations. A one-standard deviation volatility shock
generates a 1 percentage point increase in the the profit tax on impact. Conditioning on the
size of the business cycle, productivity-induced recessions result in a similar-sized response
of profit taxes, albeit in the opposite direction. By raising taxes in a volatility-induced
recession it is possible to mitigate the future implications of higher default rates, whereas in
a productivity-induced recession, only the initial rise in default matters. In both cases, we
find taxes on labor-income are counter-cyclical, quantitatively sizable, although the initial
response is short-lived.
Our results on tax policy are closely related to Chugh and Ghironi’s (2015) study of optimal
fiscal policy in a model of endogenous firm entry. They find that the Ramsey-optimal long-
run tax on firm profits is identical to that when lump-sum taxation is available and taxes (on
labor-income and firm profits) should not respond to aggregate productivity shocks when
10Overall, we find that productivity (volatility) shocks generate relatively larger fluctuations in macroeco-
nomic (financial) variables.
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preferences are of Dixit-Stiglitz type.11 The design of fiscal policy with firm entry has also
been studied in environments with physical capital (Coto-Martinez et al., 2007), long-run
risk (Croce et al., 2013), and oligopolistic competition (Colciago, 2016).12 We contribute to
this recent literature by allowing for financial frictions and focusing on the implications for
short-run optimal stabilization policy arising from changes in firm-level volatility.
There is a related literature that has shown how the interaction of financial market frictions
and changes in firm-level volatility play and important role in explaining aggregate fluctua-
tions. For example, in Christiano et al. (2014) a widening in the distribution of productivity
shocks increases the fraction of loan defaults, and in Gilchrist et al. (2014), financial frictions
magnify shocks to firm-level volatility through movements in credit spreads. Arellano et al.
(2012) argue that the majority of the decline in employment during the 2007-09 recession
can be explained by an increase in the volatility of firm-level shocks. Our analytical and
quantitative results imply that changes in the volatility of firm-level shocks not only help
explain aggregate fluctuations but that the interaction of financial frictions and firm-level
shocks play a role in shaping policy decisions.
Finally, our paper contributes the literature on firm entry and exit more broadly. Our
approach is most similar to Bilbiie et al. (2012).13 To their model of firm entry we al-
low for endogenous exit by incorporating ex-post firm-level heterogeneity, a working capital
constraint, and financial frictions. A complementary approach to studying firm entry and
11In Chugh and Ghironi (2015), the extent to which profits should be taxed (in the long-run and short-run)
is discussed in the context of preference aggregation. We choose to work with a form of preferences that
lead to constant long-run taxes to focus on the role of financial frictions.
12Lewis and Winkler (2015) also analyse tax policy with endogenous firm entry. They focus on the
structure of demand and costs of firms entry.
13Bilbiie et al. (2012) assume monopolistic competition in the product market. Chatterjee and Cooper
(1993) and Devereux et al. (1996) also develop general equilibrium models with procyclical firm entry and
monopolistic competition.
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exit, which amends Hopenhayn’s (1992) model with ex-ante heterogeneous firms to allow for
investment in physical capital and aggregate shocks, is developed by Clementi and Palazzo
(2015). Our modelling choices - which imply a symmetric employment decision by firms in
equilibrium - are driven by the desire to generate relatively simple policy implications. A
general point, however, is that, in either setting, firm entry is a form of investment in which
up-front costs incurred to start a business generate expected future profits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a general
equilibrium model of firm entry and financial frictions. We show how shocks to firm-level
volatility affect firm entry and the firm default rate and we derive analytical expressions for
optimal fiscal policy when lump-sum taxation is available. In sections 3 and 4 we assess the
quantitative impact of exogenous changes in firm-level volatility and aggregate productivity.
In section 5 we revisit fiscal policy and study the optimal mix of taxes on labor-income
and firm profits when the government issues state-contingent real debt. A final section
concludes.
2. Static Model
In this section we develop a general equilibrium model of firm entry and financial frictions.
We first discuss the setup of the model, specify the optimization problem for households and
firms, and the definition of equilibrium. We then study optimal fiscal policy.
2.1. Setup
The economy is populated by a measure nt > 0 of firms and a measure one of households
and financial intermediaries. Each firm has a linear production technology and supplies a
differentiated good with an idiosyncratic level of demand, ε ≥ 0. New firms are created
each period by paying a one-time entry cost. Households consume a basket of goods and
supply labor inelastically. Financial intermediaries hold deposits from households and issue
7
intra-period working capital loans to firms.14 Each firm repays it’s working capital loan to
a financial intermediary if it has sufficient revenue to do so. Firms default if their revenue is
insufficient to repay the loan. When a firm defaults, the intermediary repossesses the assets
of the firm, subject to a cost of receivership.15
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of the period new firms are
created and households place deposits with financial intermediaries. Firms then make an
employment decision and sign a contract with a financial intermediary to cover their working
capital requirements. Production takes place and idiosyncratic demand (and revenue) is
realized. Firms with a sufficiently high level of demand, ε ∈ [ε?t ,∞), sell their goods to
households. Firms with a low level of demand, ε ∈ [0, ε?t ), default. Households receive
net-of-tax profits from production, interest payments on deposits, and a lump-sum transfer
from the government. At the end of the period all non-defaulting firms exit.
Households Each household has a constant elasticity of substitution utility function,
Ct =
{∫
i∈Ω
[ε× ct (i)]θ di
}1/θ
(1)
where ct (i) is the consumption of good i ∈ Ω and 1/ (1− θ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitu-
tion. The integration over the probability space Ω is nt
∫
dG (ε) and G(ε) is the cumulative
distribution function of idiosyncratic demand shocks.16 The standard deviation of firm-level
demand is denoted σt and we refer to unanticipated changes in this variable as firm-level
volatility shocks. Households are endowed with one unit of labor that they supply inelas-
tically and they receive wages, wt, in units of consumption. Households also own an equal
14The technological restriction we place on the transfer of resources from firms to households is similar to
Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
15Our formulation is equivalent to all firms selling their production and the financial intermediary bearing
the burden of unpaid loans.
16Similar to Bernard et al. (2011) the firm-level shock reflects product attributes or product appeal.
Midrigan (2011) refers to this shock as a quality shock.
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share of firms.
Firms Each firm produces a differentiated good with technology,
yt (i) = lt (i) (2)
where yt (i) is the output and lt (i) is the employment level of firm i. Firms use working
capital to finance their labor requirements. Working capital requires a loan, at gross rate
rt ≥ 1, equal to wtlt (i).17 The profit of firm i, with demand level ε, is written as,
pit (i, ε) = pt (i, ε) yt (i)− wtrtlt (i) (3)
where pt (i, ε) is the price of good i in units of consumption, pt (i, ε) yt (i) is firm revenue, and
wtrtlt (i) is the debt of firm i. Throughout the analysis we assume firms operate under limited
liability and act as though profit is bounded from below at zero. This implies a threshold
level of demand, ε?t , determines the mass of firms unable to meet their debt obligations ex-
post. This default-threshold level of demand is defined as ε?t ≡ inf {ε : pit (i, ε) > 0} and the
probability of default is G (ε?t ) =
∫ ε?t
0
dG (ε).
There is an unbounded mass of potential entrants. The creation of a new firm is sub-
ject to a one-time entry cost. Firms enter until conditional expected profits, pi (ε?t ) ≡∫∞
ε?t
pit (i, ε) dG (ε); that is, expected profit conditional on not defaulting, net of a profit tax,
τt < 1, is equal to the cost of entry. The free entry condition reads,
(1− τt) pi (ε?t ) = fe (4)
where the cost of entry, fe > 0, is specified in units of output.
18 All non-defaulting firms
17The interest rate on loans, rt, is strictly greater than the interest rate on deposits. The deposit rate is
exogenous in this version of the model.
18Firms face entry costs before starting production (for example, see Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)). As
emphasized by Djankov et al. (2002), entry costs not only reflect the time and effort of the entrepreneur,
but also bureaucratic and transactions costs required for setting up a business. Higher taxes reduce entry
rates. Da Rin et al. (2008) present evidence on taxes an entry rates in European countries.
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exit the market each period.
Financial Intermediaries Each financial intermediary receives deposits from households
and issues working capital loans to firms. When a firm defaults, a financial intermediary
repossesses the firms assets, subject to a cost of receivership, κ > 0. The expected assets
of a financial intermediary are the revenue from the repayment of loans, the assets from
liquidated firms, less the cost of receivership. Financial intermediaries are competitive and
earn zero profit, which leads to,[∫ ∞
ε?t
dG (ε) +
∫ ε?t
0
(
ε
ε?t
)θ
dG (ε)
]
rt − rdt = κ [G (ε?t ) /wtlt] (5)
where
∫∞
ε?t
dG (ε) is the survival probability of a firm and
∫ ε?t
0
(ε/ε?t )
θ dG (εt) is the ratio of
assets-to-loans of defaulting firms. The liabilities of financial intermediaries are given by
rdtwtlt, where r
d
t is the interest rate on deposits. Equation (5) defines the interest rate on
working capital loans.
2.2. Optimization
Each household chooses the consumption level, ct (i), to minimize the cost of acquiring Ct,
taking prices and income as given. This leads to a standard downward-sloped demand curve
for each good,
ct (i) =
[
pt (i, ε)
εθ
]−1/(1−θ)
Yt (6)
where Yt is aggregate output.
Each firm chooses an employment level, lt (i), subject to demand and technological con-
straints, given by equations (2) and (6), market clearing, ct (i) = yt (i). Proposition 1
characterizes the optimal employment decision of firm i. To economize on notation, in what
follows we drop the i index.
10
Proposition 1 Profit maximization implies firm-level employment, l (ε?t ), and the default-
threshold level of demand, ε?t , are determined by the following conditions.[
∆(0)
l (ε?t )
1/θ
]1−θ
(ε?t )
θ = wtrt and θ
∫ ∞
ε?t
εθtdG(εt) = [1−G (ε?t )] (ε?t )θ (7)
where ∆ (0) ≡ [∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
.
Proof See Appendix A. 
The first equation in Proposition 1 determines firm-level employment as a function of the
marginal cost of production - the wage rate multiplied by the interest rate on loans - wtrt.
19
One implication of this condition is that, all else equal, a higher default-threshold level
of demand, ε?t , or an increased probability of default, G (ε
?
t ), is associated with greater
employment. This is because an increase in employment, at the firm-level, requires more
debt, with working capital loans equal to wtrtl (ε
?
t ). In turn, to avoid default, a more
indebted firm needs to generate more revenue, and this implies a higher default-threshold
level of demand.
The second expression in Proposition 1 determines the default-threshold level of demand.
Products with demand εt ∈ [0, ε?t ) are taken into receivership and products with demand
εt ∈ [ε?t ,∞) are sold directly to consumers. An important property of this equation is that
it uniquely determines the default-threshold. Thus, whilst ε?t is directly affected by move-
ments in the volatility of firm-level shocks, it is unaffected by the firms optimal employment
decision.20 This simplifying property allows us to characterize analytically the relation-
19In this version of the model, because of the nature of the contract with financial intermediaries, the
interest rate at which loans are re-paid is independent of aggregate uncertainty. We relax this assumption
in section 3.
20We can re-introduce the dependence of the default-threshold level of demand on firm size by allowing
for overhead costs. This point is relevant for the quantitative analysis of section 4.
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ship between firm-level volatility, the default-threshold, and the probability of default. We
summarize the result in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 When idiosyncratic shocks have a log normal distribution and the default-
threshold level of demand is defined by θ
∫∞
ε?
εθtdG(εt) = [1−G (ε?t )] (ε?t )θ, the default thresh-
old and the probability of default increase with the volatility of firm-level shocks for G(ε?t ) <
1/2.
Proof See Appendix A. 
An increase in the volatility of firm-level shocks is equivalent to an increase in the stan-
dard deviation of log (ε). For an individual firm, all else equal, a higher default-threshold
level of demand raises the probability of default, and is consistent with an increase in firm-
size. Proposition 2 shows that the default-threshold and probability of default also in-
crease with the volatility of firm-level shocks. At this point it is useful to define ∆ (ε?t ) ≡[
1
1−G(ε?t )
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
such that the default-threshold level of demand is implicitly deter-
mined by [ε?t/∆ (ε
?
t )]
θ = θ. This new variable captures the relative dispersion of demand
across non-defaulting firms, is a measure of conditional expected revenue, and acts as an
endogenous revenue shifter. As the default-threshold rises, so does conditional expected
revenue.21
An increase in firm-level volatility leads to a higher default-threshold level of demand and
also raises conditional expected revenue. This explains why firms increase their demand
for labor when there is greater underlying volatility. With monopolistic competition (such
that profits are concave in prices) and flexibility in the factor input (the distribution of
demand is known before employment decisions are made) firms expand to take advantage of
a potentially good realization of demand which is reflected in a positive shift in conditional
21Formally, we can show,
∂[∆(ε?t )]
θ
∂ε?t
=
dG(ε?t )
[1−G(ε?t )]2
∫∞
ε?t
[
εθ − (ε?t )θ
]
dG (ε) > 0 where ε?t < ε and ∆ (ε
?
t ) >
∆ (0).
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expected revenue. This change in factor demand under increased uncertainty - in our case
via demand shocks - is consistent with an Oi-Hartman-Abel effect (Bloom, 2014). However,
because an increase in conditional expected revenue is also associated with a rising default-
threshold, as volatility rises, firms are increasingly unlikely to generate sufficient revenue to
repay their working capital loans. This is why the increase in volatility also implies an
increase in the proportion of firms that default.
2.3. Equilibrium
Labor is used for the production of goods and labor market equilibrium requires,
L = n (ε?t ) l (ε
?
t ) (8)
where L = 1. Equation (8) implies that increased employment at the firm level, l (ε?t ),
translates directly into fewer operating firms, n (ε?t ). Finally, the resource constraint of the
economy is,
Yt = Ct + fen (ε
?
t ) + κ [n (ε
?
t )G (ε
?
t )] (9)
where Yt = [n (ε
?
t )]
(1−θ)/θ ∆(0) is aggregate output, fen (ε?t ) represents investment (at the
extensive margin), and κ [n (ε?t )G (ε
?
t )] is the resource cost associated with firm defaults.
We now consider the impact of a change in the volatility of firm-level shocks onto aggregate
variables. An immediate result is that there are two opposing effects of increased firm-level
volatility on aggregate output. Expected revenue, ∆(0) =
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
, which increases
with volatility, raises aggregate output, whereas the mass of operating firms, n (ε?t ), falls,
and this reduces output. The size of the fall in n (ε?t ) is determined by the firm employment
decision (see Proposition 1) and its strength onto output is greater the larger are the returns-
to-variety (and the larger the monopolistic markup).22 Overall, more volatility leads to lower
output and from this point on we refer to this as a volatility-induced recession.
22We focus on the case in which the returns-to-variety are less than unity. The returns-to-variety are
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An increase in firm-level volatility raises the default-threshold level of demand and the firm
default rate is countercyclical (by Proposition 2). A higher default rate is also associated
with a rise in the economy-wide level of debt. This can be seen by summing over firm prof-
its, given by equation (3), which implies, pi (ε?t ) = [∆(0)]
1−θ [n (ε?t )]
1−1/θ l (ε?t )
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG (ε)−
[1−G (ε?t )]wrl (ε?t ), and then using Proposition 1 and the free entry condition - equation
(4). Doing so generates the following expression, wl (ε?t ) r = θ/ (1− θ) (1− τt) [1−G (ε?t )].
Since the overall mass of operating firms falls, and at the firm-level, employment rises, a
volatility-induced recession is one in which there are fewer, larger firms, and a higher level
of indebtedness.
Finally, we can explain the role of financial frictions on firm profits. Expected profit is
given by pit = (1− θ) [Yt/n (ε?t )] > 0 and this always rises in a volatility-induced recession.
Moreover, this implies that the fall in the extensive margin of investment (firm entry) is larger
than the fall in aggregate output. The easiest way to understand these points is to recall that
the free entry condition requires conditional expected profit equal, fe/ (1− τ) = pi (ε?t ) =
D (ε?t )×pit, where D (ε?t ) ≡ [1−G (ε?t )] [∆ (ε?t ) /∆(0)]θ is an endogenous wedge generated by
the presence of financial frictions. The financial frictions wedge falls as volatility rises.23
2.4. Fiscal Policy
Our model explains how changes in the volatility of firm-level shocks are consistent with
procyclical firm entry and a countercyclical firm default rate. So far, however, we have
not discussed the role of fiscal policy. In this section, we study optimal fiscal policy by
given by (1− θ) /θ > 0; the markup minus one, and there is increasing returns to an expansion in variety
with the degree 1/θ. We make this restriction because firm entry costs are specified in units of output.
23Re-write the function D (ε?t ) in the following way, D (ε
?
t ) =
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG(ε)∫∞
0
εθdG(ε)
= 1 −
∫ ε?
0
εθdG(ε)∫∞
0
εθdG(ε)
< 1. The
proof that D′ (ε?t ) is immediate. In the Appendix we also show formally that D (ε
?
t ) falls with volatility for
G(ε?t ) < 1/2.
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considering the taxation of firm profits (τt < 1) when a lump-sum tax balances the budget
each period. Specifically, we assume the government budget constraint is,
Tt = τt [n (ε
?
t ) pi (ε
?
t )] (10)
where Tt is a lump-sum transfer to the household and the right-hand side of equation (10)
is total government revenue.
An important result of this section is that the government faces two trade-offs when deciding
on fiscal policy. The first is relatively standard and stems from a profit destruction effect
and a consumer surplus effect when firm entry is endogenous.24 The second trade-off stems
from the reduction in firm entry generated by financial frictions and the resource implications
of costly default. Despite the presence of financial frictions we can reduce the optimal fiscal
policy problem of the government to one of choosing the mass of operating firms to maximize
consumption. Specifically,
max
n(ε?t )
Ct = [n (ε
?
t )]
(1−θ)/θ ∆(0)− n (ε?t ) [fe + κG (ε?t )] (11)
The solution to the optimization problem presented in equation (11) leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal profit tax is,
τt = 1− 1
θ
[
1
1 + (κ/fe)G (ε?t )
]
1
D (ε?t )
(12)
where,
G (ε?t ) =
∫ ε?t
0
dG (ε) and D (ε?t ) =
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG (ε)∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
(13)
and fe and κ are positive constants and θ
−1 > 1.
24This terminology is taken from Grossman and Helpman (1991) and is also used by Bilbiie et al. (2008).
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Proof See Appendix A. 
It is immediate from Proposition 3 that without financial frictions; that is, when G (ε?t )→ 0
and D (ε?t ) → 1, optimal fiscal policy would be require a subsidy to firms equal to the
monopolistic markup, 1/θ. A subsidy is required, in this case, because the returns-to-
variety outweigh the reduction in profit per-firm implied by additional entry. This trade-off
(which we call the firm entry trade-off) is relatively standard and is discussed in Bilbiie et al.
(2008) and Chugh and Ghironi (2015). From the perspective of this analysis, an important
property of equation (12), and the constant elasticity of substitution preferences we assume,
is that, without financial frictions, the profit tax is independent of the business cycle and
there is no role for short-run stabilization policy.25
With financial frictions the government faces a second trade-off when deciding on the rate at
which to tax firm profits. The financial-frictions trade-off is captured by a single statistic:
the default-threshold level of demand. Proposition 1 shows that this statistic is independent
of the rest of the economy, and as such, we can start by thinking about how a change in
ε?t affects optimal fiscal policy. An increase in ε
?
t implies a higher default rate, G (ε
?
t ),
which despite the fall in the mass of operating firms, n (ε?t ), also increases the resource costs
associated with firm default. As the default rate rises, it is therefore optimal to restrict
entry, relative to the case without financial frictions, and the subsidy to firms falls.26
The second implication of a rising default-threshold is that the financial frictions wedge -
captured by the variable D (ε?t ) - falls with ε
?
t . As discussed above, the financial frictions
25Bilbiie et al. (2008) and Chugh and Ghironi (2015) both analyse the steady-state of a dynamic model
without default. The exact specification of the profit tax depends entry costs and the form of preferences.
26We also note that since entry costs also matter for tax policy, any regulatory policy aimed at encouraging
entry should be partly offset with taxation. It is well-documented that costs of firm entry vary across
countries and that these have important macroeconomic implications (Poschke, 2010 and Barseghyan and
DiCecio, 2011).
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wedge relates conditional expected profit to expected profit, and as D (ε?t ) falls; that is, as
pit/pi (ε
?
t ) rises, financial frictions have a stronger impact on profits and firm entry. In this
case, greater financial frictions call for a subsidy to firms. Subsidizing firms, however, leads
to an increase in entry, and magnifies the resource costs associated with default. This is
precisely why the government faces a second trade-off when deciding on fiscal policy. Higher
subsidies are required because firm entry is lower under financial frictions but taxation is
possible when the resource costs of default are sufficiently large.
We also determine how fiscal policy reacts over the business cycle. To understand the
response of the tax on firm profits, let κ → 0, such that only the financial frictions wedge
matters for the optimal policy decision (this special case has no implications for the response
of output to a volatility shock). Define x?t ≡ [ln (ε?t )− µ] /σt, where σt is the measure of
firm-level volatility and µ is the location parameter of the lognormal distribution. Following
an exogenous change in the volatility of firm-level shocks, the optimal change in the profit
tax is given by,
τ̂t = −Φ
′ (− (x? − θσ))
θ
× [x?x̂?t − θ (σσ̂t)] (14)
where a caret denotes the deviation of a variable from its long-run value (with τ̂t ≡ τt − τ)
and Φ(x?) is the CDF of the normal distribution.27 Since τ is negative when κ → 0, the
sign of the change in the profit tax that results from a change in firm-level volatility depends
on the sign of the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of equation (14). In
this term, x?t is negative and x̂
?
t is positive (since ε̂
?
t > 0). Thus, for a given increase in
volatility - such that σ̂t > 0 - the subsidy to profits increases. However, as κ > 0 rises, so
do the resource implications of default. Thus, when default is sufficiently costly, shocks to
firm-level volatility are associated with pro-cyclical tax policy.
3. Dynamic Model
27Specifically, Φ(x?) = 1√
2pi
∫ x?
−∞ exp
[−(x)2/2] dx and Φ′ (− (x? − θσ)) > 0.
17
In this section we develop a dynamic version of the model in which firms are long-lived. We
also generalize the financial contract between firms and financial intermediaries to account
for productivity shocks.28 The most important implication of this change is that the default
threshold depends on the realization of aggregate productivity. The model thus generates a
strong response of the credit interest rate to both volatility and productivity shocks. Finally,
we endogenize the labor supply decision and the deposit interest rate which were fixed in
the model of section 2 and allow the government to issue state-contingent real debt.
3.1. Long-Lived Firms, Endogenous Labor Supply, and Government Debt
We define the net worth of a firm as zt (ε, at) ≡ max [(1− τt)Etpit (ε, at) , 0]+vt (εt, at), where
vt (ε, at) is the price of the firm at the end-of-period t, after the realization of uncertainty,
and at is aggregate productivity. Under this formulation, once a firm defaults, its value is
retained and sold by the firm in the following period. The instantaneous profit function is
now written as,
pit (ε, at) = max
{
εθ × [n1/θ∆(0)lt]1−θ atlθt − wtrt (lt + fo) , 0} (15)
which is a generalization of equation (3) with production technology yt = atlt. In equation
(15), the term fo > 0 is a quasi-fixed overhead cost, and lt is average firm-level employment,
which is taken as given by the firm when maximizing net worth.29 Throughout this section,
due to presence of aggregate productivity shocks, and the specification of the financial con-
tract, the default threshold and credit interest rate are such that, ε?t = ε
?(at) and rt = r(at).
To conserve on notation we suppress this index but it should be clear that both variables
are implicit functions of aggregate productivity. We summarize the optimal employment
choice in the following Proposition.
28See sections 3.1 and 3.2 of Bernanke et al. (1999) for a discussion of a financial contract with aggregate
risk and productivity shocks in the canonical model of the financial accelerator.
29In our specification the entire wage bill is borrowed in advance. Evidence for this assumption is presented
in Lewis and Poilly (2012).
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Proposition 4 Profit maximization implies the following optimal level of employment.
Et
∫ ∞
ε?t
[
θatε
θ − at(ε?t )θ
(
lt
lt + fo
)]
dG(ε) = 0 (16)
for ε > ε?t where ε
?
t = ε
?(at) is determined by (ε
?
t )
θ
[
n
1/θ
t ∆(0)
]1−θ
atlt−wtrt (lt + fo) = 0 and
rt = r(at) is determined by the zero-profit condition for financial intermediaries.
Proof See Appendix A. 
Household intertemporal utility is,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (Ct, Lt) (17)
where Lt is total labor supply and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. Period utility,
u(·), is a standard additively separable function. It is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in Ct and strictly decreasing and strictly convex in Lt.
Households place deposits, dt, with financial intermediaries, and hold shares, xt, in firms.
They also have access to a complete set of state-contingent government bonds, Bst+1. House-
holds maximize their lifetime utility, subject to the following flow budget constraint,
dt +
∑
s
1
rst+1
Bst+1 + Ct +
nt+1
1− δxtvt = r
d
t−1dt−1 +B
s
t +
(
1− τLt
)
wtLt + ntxt−1z (ε?t ) (18)
where rdt and r
s
t+1 are the rates of return on deposits and bonds, respectively, τ
L
t is a tax on
labor-income, and z (ε?t ) =
∫∞
ε?t
z (ε, at) dG (ε) is conditional expected net worth. Household
decisions over deposits, bonds, and equity are characterized by standard consumption Euler
equations and labor supply is determined by a standard labor-leisure trade-off which equates
the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure to the expected wage.
Each period there is an exogenous probability of firm exit equal to δ ∈ (0, 1). The free entry
condition reads,
v0 = E0
∞∑
t=1
M0,t (1− τt)pi (ε?t ) = fe (19)
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In equation (19), the term uC (t) denotes the period t marginal utility from consumption
and M0,t = [β (1− δ)]t uC (0) /uC (t) is a stochastic discount factor. As before, conditional
expected profit in period t is denoted by pi (ε?t ). The law of motion for the mass of firms is,
nt+1 = (1− δ) (nt + ne,t) (20)
which reflects the assumption that there is a one-period lag between entry and production.
The government collects taxes on labor-income and firm profits and issues state-contingent
real debt to finance an exogenous constant stream of government spending, G > 0. The
flow government budget constraint is,
τLt wtLt + τtntxt−1pi (ε
?
t ) +
∑
s
1
rst+1
Bst+1 = Bt +G (21)
where τLt wtLt + τtntxt−1pi (ε
?
t ) is government income from taxation.
3.2. Model Summary
Table 1 presents the equations for the model economy,
===== Table 1 Here =====
where the ε?t index has been suppressed where possible. The term uL (t) denotes the period
t marginal dis-utility from labor and the term ηt ≡
∫ ε?t
0
εθdG (ε) reflects the ratio of assets-
to-loans of defaulting firms. The conditions in Table 1 form a 12 variable system which
solve the model for {Ct, Yt, Lt, lt, nt, ne,t, zt, pit} and
{
wt, r
d
t−1, rt
}
, and {ε?t}, with given tax
policies,
{
τt, τ
L
t
}
, government expenditure, G > 0, and exogenous processes, {σt, at}.
4. Quantitative Analysis
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In this section we undertake a quantitative analysis of the model developed in section 3.30
We first outline the calibration of the steady-state and then compute impulse responses of
endogenous variables for one-time shocks to firm-level volatility and aggregate productivity.
4.1. Parameterization and Calibration
This section discusses the parameterization and calibration of the steady-state of the model.
We start with standard technology and preference parameters, followed by fiscal variables,
and finally the distribution of firm-level shocks and fixed cost parameters. The discount
rate is set at β = 0.98 and we adopt the following functional form for period utility,
u (Ct, Lt) = lnCt + χ
(1− Lt)1−υ − 1
1− υ (22)
The scale parameter χ > 0 in equation (22) is set such that that households allocate 20
percent of their time to work in the steady-state. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply with
respect to wages - here equal to uL/uLLL > 0 - is assumed to be 0.72, based on the empirical
evidence in Heathcote et al. (2010). The elasticity of substitution between differentiated
goods is set at 3.8. This value is taken from Bernard et al. (2003) and, without financial
frictions, implies a markup of 35.7 percent. Finally, we set δ = 0.1 to match an annual exit
rate for firms of 10 percent.
Fiscal variables - government expenditure-to-output and labor-income and firm profit taxes -
are set at
{
g, τL, τ
}
= {0.2, 0.2, 0.25}, respectively. When we consider optimal fiscal policy
in section 4 we set the steady-state debt-to-output ratio at b ≡ B/Y = 0.42. The values
for g and b are taken from Schmitt-Grohe` and Uribe (2005) and the values for τL and τ are
taken from Arseneau and Chugh (2010) and Gourio and Miao (2010), respectively.
We also assign a value to long-run firm-level volatility. Recall that the standard deviation
of firm-level demand is denoted by σt and this captures firm-level volatility in the model.
30In this section we also revert to the assumption that the government has a lump-sum transfer available
to balance its budget.
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Empirical estimates of firm-level volatility range from 0.09, used in Bachmann and Bayer
(2012), to 0.23, used in Christiano et al. (2013). We use an intermediate value of σ = 0.135
based on Comin and Mulani (2006).31 Given long-run micro volatility, we then calibrate
overhead and default costs to match two features of the data. Normalizing the parameter
governing entry costs to unity (fe = 1), we set overhead costs parameter (f0 > 0) such that
the default rate is 1.0%. We base this calibration on historical value-weighted default rates
of non-financials reported in Giesecke et al. (2011).32 We then set the default cost parameter
(κ > 0) to generate an average credit spread of 160 basis points which corresponds to the
median of the BBB-Treasury spread as reported in Gilchrist et al. (2014).
Table 2 presents the parameters we use in our calibration.33
===== Table 2 Here =====
Our calibration has implications for variables other than those presented in Table 2. The
average price-markup in our model is given by [θ∆(0)]−1 [∆(0)/∆ (ε?t )]
θ. Our calibration
implies a price-markup of 21.7 percent once we account for financial frictions. Also, although
the use of overhead labor in our economy is used to match default rates, it implies overhead
costs account for 6.5 percent of total employment. Bartelsman et al. (2013) suggest that
firms’ use of overhead labor accounts for approximately 14 percent of total employment in
U.S. manufacturing establishments. We can match this figure, but keeping default rates
31Comin and Mulani (2006) use annual data on net sales from COMPUSTAT and find that since 1980
average (weighted) volatility is around 0.135. Arellano et al. (2012) - who also focus on demand shocks -
use sales growth data and find 0.18.
32Giesecke et al. (2011) report that the mean (median) default rate for US nonfinancial is around 1.52%
(0.54%). Over the long term, the also argue that credit spreads are twice as large as default losses, such
that the average credit risk premium is 0.8%.
33When we perform sensitivity analysis we deviate from this baseline calibration and consider alternative
values for σ, κ, and fo.
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below 1 percent requires lower firm-level volatility. Finally, business investment as a fraction
of aggregate output across OECD countries is between 10 and 15 percent, and our calibration
implies a value of 13.1 percent.
4.2. Exogenous Movements in Volatility and Productivity
In this section we consider the impact of a one-time one-standard-deviation shock to firm-
level volatility and aggregate productivity. We focus the discussion on the response of
financial variables - the default rate and credit interest rate spread - and the extent to which
the interaction of financial frictions and the shock we consider effect the firm entry decision.
Firm-level volatility and productivity are specified as independent AR(1) processes,
ηt = A0 + Aηt−1 + ωt (23)
where ηt = [ln (σt) , ln (at)]
T , A0 = [0.135, 1]
T , and A is a 2 × 2 matrix describing the
autoregressive component of the processes which we parameterize as A =
 0.834 0
0 0.934
.
The term ωt = [ωσ,t, ωa,t]
T is a vector of normally distributed, mean-zero shocks, where
V ar (ωa,t) = 0.028
2 and V ar (ωa,t) = 0.011
2. The parameter values assigned to these
processes are based on empirical estimates using US manufacturing data and are described
in Chugh (2016).34
Figure 1 shows the response of key endogenous variables for a positive one standard-deviation
shock to σt. The horizontal axis measures years and the vertical axis measures the percentage
deviation from the steady-state, unless otherwise stated.
===== Figure 1 Here =====
34Using annual manufacturing data, Chugh (2016) estimates innovations to firm-level volatility at 0.0276.
We use this value because we want to take a conservative position on the role of volatility shocks. Chugh’s
long-run estimate of firm-level volatility is 0.156 which is close to the value we use.
23
A one-standard-deviation increase in firm-level volatility (a volatility-induced recession) leads
to a 19 basis points rise in the firm default rate and a 11 basis points rise in the credit interest
rate premium on impact. Increased volatility leads to a rise in the firm default rate in our
economy because it is optimal for firms to expand and take advantage of potentially good
realizations of demand. They can do so by hiring more labor but this requires that they
take on more debt due to working capital constraints. In a more volatile economy, firms
therefore need to generate a greater level of revenue to avoid default, and ε?t rises. The
impulse responses also show that, from year 3 onwards, both the default rate and credit
interest rate premium are lower than their pre-shock levels and afterwards slowly increase.
This is a result of an interaction between the default-threshold level of demand and firm-level
employment when there are overhead costs.35
The response of the mass of operating firms to a change in firm-level volatility is hump-
shaped. Greater volatility reduces firm entry, and over time, less entry translates into a
gradual reduction in the number of available goods. This effect peaks after 4 years by which
time the initial rise in volatility has dropped by around 90 percent. Whilst the change in
the mass of operating firms is relatively small (dropping by 0.2 percent) the transition back
to the steady state is persistent. The model is relatively less successful at capturing labor
market dynamics. Aggregate employment drops by less than 0.1 percent in response to an
increase in volatility. Given the mechanism in the model this is perhaps not too surprising
- recall that aggregate employment is Lt = nt (lt + f) - because the only way for firms to
take advantage of greater volatility is to expand production. Thus, a sufficiently large fall
in the mass of operating firms is required for aggregate labor supply to fall.
In the calibrated economy, the long-run default rate is 1 percent, with an investment pre-
mium of 60 b.p., and the size of the innovations to volatility we consider are relatively
35In section 2 we characterize the response of the default rate analytically assuming no overhead costs.
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conservative.36 Despite this, the interaction of firm-level volatility shocks and financial
frictions have important aggregate implications. As a simple robustness check, in the first
instance, we maintained the premium and reduced firm default to 0.4 percent (low default).
We then maintained the default rate of 1 percent but reduced the premium to 30 b.p. (low
premium). In both cases, we kept long-run volatility at σ = 0.135. In a second case, we
set σ = 0.1 and used the baseline specification of 1 percent default with a 60 b.p. premium.
Our main finding is that lowering the long-run volatility generates a larger response of firm
entry, on impact, but firm-level employment is less persistent.
Figure 2 shows the response of key endogenous variables for a negative one standard-deviation
shock to at.
===== Figure 2 Here =====
In a productivity-induced recession, we find the firm default rises by 59 basis points and
the credit interest rate premium rises by 33 basis points on impact. The initial response of
the default rate and credit spread is broadly similar to that of a volatility-induced recession
once we condition on the size of the business cycle. The mechanism underlying the initial
response of financial variables to the productivity shock is the following. As firms become
less productive, on average, some firms are unable to generate sufficient revenue, and these
firms default. This causes the default threshold (and the default probability) to rise.
Quantitatively, the increase in the default threshold depends in an important way on the
cost of default, which is parameterized by κ > 0. Consider the following date t = 0 partial
equilibrium expression, derived using the zero profit condition for firms (the default-threshold
36For example, Christiano et al. (2013) estimate innovations to be nearly twice as large. Arellano et al.
(2012) also assume a considerably larger value than we do.
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equation) and for financial intermediaries (see equation (5)) which respectively determine
ε?0 = ε
?(a0) and r0 = r(a0),
ε̂?0 = −
[
1
θ − ηr,ε (κ)
]
â0 where ηr,ε
(
κ
−
)
(24)
for θ > ηr,ε (κ). The term ηr,ε (κ) is decreasing in µ because whilst the default equation
shows that ε?0 declines with a0 it increases with the credit interest rate, r0. The elasticity
of the interest rate with respect to default increases with the cost of default-threshold such
that there is a feedback effect which does not occur with firm-level volatility shocks.
A second feature of productivity shocks is that, after the initial period, the default probability
drops below it’s pre-shock level whilst macroeconomic variables remain below their pre-
shock level for many periods. This is because, after the initial period, the entire path of
productivity is known, and lower productivity simply causes firms to cut back on production.
Whilst the unexpected component of productivity has a strong effect on financial variables
in the model, there is very little impact of future expected changes in productivity.37
5. Optimal Fiscal Policy
In this section we revisit the results on optimal fiscal policy. In section 2 the optimal tax
on firm profits was characterized analytically under the assumption that lump-sum taxation
was available to balance the budget. We showed that the government faced a firm entry
trade-off and a financial frictions trade-off. In the quantitative version of the model there
is an additional static distortion (an endogenous labor supply decision) and instrument (a
tax on labor-income) and we assume the government issues state-contingent real debt. The
policy choices - the optimal mix of taxes on labor-income and firm profits - are also therefore
37This finding (i.e., procyclical default) is related to a well-known result in models of the financial acceler-
ator with shocks to aggregate productivity. Despite the obvious differences, after periods t = 1, our default
rate behaves in a similar way to the models of Calstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Gomes et al. (2003).
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subject to a present value implementability constraint associated with the absence of lump-
sum taxation.
In what follows the government solves the following reduced problem.
Definition 1 Given the exogenous processes {σt, at}∞t=0 plans Ωt ≡ {ne,t, nt+1, Ct, Lt, lt}∞t=0
and {ε?t}∞t=0 represent the optimal allocation if they solve the following problem.
max
{Ωt,ε?t }∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Lt, ξ) + βtλ1,t [Yt −G− Ct − fene,t − κntG (ε?t )]
+βtE0λ2,t [Lt − nt (lt + fo)] + βtλ3,t [(1− δ) (nt + ne,t)− nt+1]
+βtE0λ4,t
{∫ ∞
ε?t
[
θatε
θ
t − at(ε?t )θ
(
lt
lt + fo
)]
dG(εt)
}
− ξA (25)
where,
U(Ct, Lt) ≡ u(Ct, Lt) + ξ [uC(t)Ct + uL(t)Lt] (26)
and given,
A ≡ uC(0)
[
rd−1d−1 + b0 + n0z (ε
?
0)
]
(27)
where {λj,t}4j=1 are lagrange multipliers associated with constraints, and ξ is a (constant)
lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability constraint.
A detailed derivation of the reduced policy problem - as stated in equations (25)-(27) - is
presented in Appendix B.38 Here we focus of the substantive point that, relative to the
case without default, the only additional constraint placed on the policy maker is the labor
demand equation, as presented in Proposition 4. Given the structure of the problem in
equations (25)-(27) there is a tight link between the default-threshold level of demand and
38As in the standard Ramsey taxation problem, the government is assumed to commit, as of period zero,
to time invariant policy functions for t ≥ 1. Following Chugh and Ghironi (2016), we also assume that the
schedule of state-contingent profit taxes is posted one period in advance.
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the mass of operating firms. Once the government picks ε?t > 0, for a given level of aggregate
employment, Lt, the mass of operating firms is determined as a function of the underlying
shocks. The remaining constraints - over resources, both in goods and labor markets, the
law of motion for firms, and the present value implementability constraint - are the same as
when financial frictions are absent.
We are interested in short-run stabilization policy for the set of shocks specified in section 4
- specifically, the optimal response of taxes in a recession.39 Figure 3 plots the response of
taxes on labor-income and firm profits to a one-time change in volatility and productivity.
===== Figure 3 Here =====
First consider the response of taxes when there is a volatility-induced recession (top panel).
Following a one-standard deviation shock to firm-level volatility there is a 1 percentage
points rise in profit taxation (implemented in periods t ≥ 1) and 0.5 percentage points drop
in labor-income taxation. We can explain the rise in the profit tax if we recall that firm entry
falls and the default rate rises as the volatility of firm-level shocks increases. Reduced firm
entry requires a subsidy to firms whereas an increase in the default rate requires taxation.
Moreover, the response of the profit tax is consistent with the analytical section, which
assumed lump-sum taxes were available. Given taxes on firm profits, we find that the
labor-income tax should be counter-cyclical. The drop in the period t = 0 labor-income tax
presented in Figure 3 is nearly 0.5 percentage points and is in anticipation of future expected
changes in the profit tax. After period t ≥ 1, however, the labor-income tax reverts to it’s
long-run level.
When a recession is generated by a productivity shock the response of taxation is markedly
different (bottom panel). Most obvious is that the drop in profit taxes - at nearly 11
39The impluse responses we report are based on an optimal stabilization policy and represent deviations
from the steady-state of the model as calibrated in section 4.
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percentage points is large. However, if we condition on the size of the business cycle, this
change in taxation is comparable to that which occurs when there are shocks to volatility.
Intuitively, the explanation for the initial drop in the profit tax is that the government
wants to reduce default costs. Because the profit tax is set in advance, and the government
anticipates all future levels of productivity, it is optimal to encourage entry because, in
periods t ≥ 1, the default rate will be below its pre-shock level. We also find that the
response of the labor-income tax is lagged one period when there are productivity shocks.
The reason is that, whilst the productivity change has a large impact on the profit tax, this
cannot be implemented until periods t ≥ 1.
As with the analytical results, we can also ask what role default costs play in determining
the optimal response of taxes. With volatility shocks the answer is straightforward. The
lower the cost of default the less is the need to reduce subsidies to firms. With shocks to
productivity, the relationship between default costs and fiscal policy is less clear. This is
because, by lowering the cost of default, the sensitivity of the default rate to productivity
shocks rises, as shown by equation (24). Overall, we find that with a lower default cost
(that is, when there is a lower credit interest rate spread and long-run investment premium)
the response of the profit tax is qualitatively unchanged, but quantitatively, the diminished
is diminished.
Finally, we compare our results on optimal fiscal when there are productivity shocks to those
reported in Chugh and Ghironi (2015) and Colciagio (2016) both of which adopt a similar
mechanism for firm entry. Under the Dixit-Stiglitz type preferences we consider, taxes on
labor-income and firm profits are invariant over the business cycle.40 The reason is that the
price-markup is constant along the business cycle which implies inefficiency wedges are also
constant. The same point holds in our model without financial frictions. With financial
40The type of tax-smoothing result discussed in Chugh and Ghironi (2015) is first presented in Chari et
al. (1994) in the context of an RBC model.
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frictions, however, the price-markup falls in a productivity-induced recession.41 We cannot
therefore map markups into tax responses without accounting for the resource implications
of default costs and this is what creates the dual role of fiscal policy in our analysis.
6. Conclusion
This paper studies optimal fiscal policy in a general equilibrium model of firm entry and
financial frictions. We provide analytical expressions for optimal fiscal policy and show
that the government faces two trade-offs. The first arises from a profit destruction and a
consumer surplus effect when firm entry is endogenous. The second arises because financial
frictions reduce firm entry and default is costly. We also study the optimal mix of taxes on
labor-income and firm profits in a quantitative version of our model with firm-level volatility
and aggregate productivity shocks. We find a countercyclical labor-income tax is always
part of the optimal fiscal policy but the cyclicality of the profit tax is sensitive to the source
of aggregate fluctuations.
41The average price markup with financial friction is equal to [θ/∆(0)]
−1
[∆(0)/∆ (ε?t )]
θ
. Without frictions
this reduces to [θ/∆(0)]
−1
. The ∆(0) term remains in this expression due to heterogeneity in demand and
is unaffected by productivity shocks.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we present proofs for Propositions 1-4.
Appendix A.1 (Proof of Proposition 1)
Firms maximize conditional expected profit,
∫∞
ε?t
pi (i, εt) dG(εt), choosing employment level,
lt(i), subject to technology, demand, and market clearing. In units of consumption, profit
is given by, pi (i, εt) = p (i, εt) yt (i) − wtrtlt (i), where yt (i) = lt (i) = Yt
[
p (i, εt) /ε
θ
t
]−1/(1−θ)
and ε?t = inf {εt : pi (i, εt) > 0}. The unconstrained problem is,
max
lt(i),ε?t
∫ ∞
ε?t
{
(εt)
θ [lt(i)/Yt]
θ−1 lt(i)− wtrtlt(i)
}
dG(ε) (28)
with prices and Yt > 0 given. The first order conditions implies,∫ ∞
ε?t
θ (εt)
θ (lt(i)/Yt)
θ−1 dG(ε)− [1−G (ε?t )]wtrt = 0 (29)
for all i. The threshold level of demand is determined by, pi (i, ε?t ) = 0. We determine
ε?t using the expression, pi (i, ε
?
t ) = (ε
?
t )
θ [lt(i)/Yt]
θ−1 lt(i) − wtrtlt(i) = 0. Incorporating the
above first-order condition, we then find,
∫∞
ε?t
θεθtdG(εt) − [1−G (ε?t )] ε?θt = 0. The labor
demand expression also pins-down the price of a good in our model for given costs of pro-
duction. Using the demand curve, the average price is, p (ε?t ) = wtrt
1−G(ε?t )
θ
/
∫∞
ε?t
εθtdG(ε).
Finally, we solve for employment using, Yt = l (ε
?
t )
(θ−1)/θ [∫∞
0
εθtdG(ε)
]
, which implies,
(ε?t )
θ
[∫∞
0
εθtdG(ε)/l (ε
?
t )
1/θ
]1−θ
= wtrt.
Appendix A.2 (Proof of Proposition 2)
We drop time subscripts and define the following function,
f (ε?, σ) ≡
∫ ∞
ε?
θεθdG(ε, σ)− [1−G (ε?, σ)] (ε?)θ = 0 (30)
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This implicitly determines ε?. Assume ε has a lognormal distribution with PDF, g(ε, σ) =
1
εσ
√
2pi
exp
[
−(lnσ−µ)2
2σ2
]
, and define, x ≡ (ln ε− µ) /σ ⇔ ε = exp (xσ + µ). The default-
threshold level of demand is determined by,
f1 (x
?, σ) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x?
[θ (exp θσx)− (exp θσx?)]
{
exp
[−(x)2
2
]}
dx = 0
We express this condition in terms of a normal CDF, Φ(ε) ≡ 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ exp [−(x)2/2] dx, which
gives,
f1 (x
?, σ) = θ
[
exp
(
(σθ)2/2
)]
Φ(−(x? − θσ)))− [exp (θσx?)] Φ(−(x?)) (31)
We prove Proposition 2 in following steps: (i), that x? exists and is unique, (ii), that
∂
∂x
f1 (x
?, σ) < 0, (iii), that ∂
∂σ
f1 (x
?, σ) > 0 when x? < 0, and finally, (iv), that the financial
frictions wedge, D (ε?) =
∫∞
ε?
εθdG (ε) /
∫∞
0
εθdG (ε), falls with volatility.
Lemma 1 There exist and x? which satisfies (31) and ∂
∂x
f1 (x
?, σ) < 0.
Proof lim
ε→+∞
Φ(ε) = 1 and lim
ε→−∞
exp (ε) Φ(ε) = 0 implies lim
x?→−∞
f1 (x
?, σ) = θ exp ((σθ)2/2) >
0 and lim
x∗→+∞
f1 (x
?, σ) = − [exp (θσx?)] < 0. Since f1 (x?, σ) is a continuous function and
it changes sign from positive to negative, a solution exists. We know f1 (x, σ) > 0 at some
small x and f1 (x, σ) crosses zero at least once. Let x
? be the first point where f1 (x
?, σ) = 0.
As f1 (x
?, σ) approaches the line from above, ∂
∂x
f1 (x
?, σ) ≤ 0.
To prove uniqueness, recall that the lognormal distribution has strictly decreasing hazard
ratio (Thomas, 1971), and therefore,
f2(x) =
∫ ∞
x
exp
[−(x)2
2
](
exp
[−(y)2
2
])
dy =
Φ(−x?)
Φ′(x?)
(32)
is a strictly increasing function. In order to have multiple solutions there should be a x?? > x?
such that ∂
∂x
f1 (x
??, σ) ≥ 0 and f1 (x??, σ) = 0. We will show that this is impossible. To
prove our result we make use of the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 If ∂
∂x
f1 (x
?, σ) ≤ 0, then for any x?? such that x?? > x?, it is true that
∂
∂x
f1 (x
??, σ) < 0.
Proof By contradiction. Assume there is an x?? > x? such that ∂
∂x
f1 (x
??, σ) ≥ 0. This
implies,
∂
∂x
f1 (x
??, σ) = (1− θ) 1√
2pi
[exp θσx??]
(
exp
[−(x??)2
2
])
− θσ [exp θσx??] Φ(−(x??)) ≥ 0
and,
√
2pi [exp (−θσx??)]
(
exp
[
(x??)2
2
])
× ∂
∂x
f1 (x
??, σ) = (1− θ)− θσf2(x??) ≥ 0 (33)
However, ∂
∂x
f1 (x
?, σ) ≤ 0 implies (1− θ)−θσf2(x?) ≤ 0. Combining this with the preceding
expression we get f2(x
?) ≥ f2(x??). This contradicts the lemma of Thomas (1971) as
presented in equation (32). Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 prove the existence and uniqueness of
x?, the solution to (31) and that ∂
∂x
f1 (x
?, σ) < 0.
Lemma 3 If Φ(x?) < 1/2, then x? increases with volatility and D (ε?) falls with volatility.
Proof Using the definitions introduced above, D (x?, σ) = 1− Φ(x? − θσ), and,
dD (x?, σ)
dσ
=
∂D (x?, σ)
∂σ
+
∂D (x?, σ)
∂x?
dx?
dσ
= θ
1√
2pi
exp
[−(x? − θσ)2
2
]
− 1√
2pi
exp
[−(x? − θσ)2
2
]
dx?
dσ
=
1√
2pi
exp
[−(x? − θσ)2
2
](
θ − dx
?
dσ
)
In order to determine the change in D (x?, σ) when volatility increases, we require, dx?/dσ <
θ. We use definition of x?, f1 (x
?, σ) = 0. From the implicit function theorem,
−∂f1 (·)
∂x
(
dx?
dσ
− θ
)
=
∂f1 (·)
∂σ
+ θ
∂f1 (·)
∂x
where,
f1 (x
?, σ) = θ
[
exp
(
(σθ)2/2
)]
Φ(−(x? − θσ)))− [exp (θσx?)] Φ(−(x?))
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which leads to,
exp
(−(σθ)2/2) ∂f1 (·)
∂x
= (1− θ) 1√
2pi
exp
[−(x? − θσ)2
2
]
− θ2σΦ(−(x? − θσ))
and,
exp
(−(σθ)2/2)× ∂f1 (·)
∂σ
= θ2 (σθ − x?) Φ(−(x? − θσ)) + θ
2
√
2pi
exp
[−(x? − θσ)2
2
]
(34)
This leads to,
exp
(−(σθ)2/2) [∂f1 (·)
∂σ
+ θ
∂1f (·)
∂x
]
=
1√
2pi
exp
[−(x? − θσ)2
2
]
− x?Φ(−(x? − θσ))
This expression is positive if x? < 0, which is equivalent to the probability of default being less
than one half. As such, D (ε?) falls with volatility under the same conditions as Proposition
2. Note that (34) implies ∂f1(·)
∂σ
> 0 when x? < 0. Therefore dx
?
dσ
= ∂f1(·)
∂σ
/
(
−∂f1(·)
∂x
)
> 0,
and x?, and the probability of default Φ(x?) = G (ε?) increases with volatility.
Appendix A.3. (Proof of Proposition 3)
The policy problem is to choose τt to maximize consumption subject to the equilibrium condi-
tions of the model. Where possible we suppress the index ε?t in what follows. First note that
ε?t > 0 is given and the labor demand equation is not a constraint faced by the policymaker.
The policymaker chooses the following allocations and prices: {Ct, nt, lt, Yt, wt, rt}. Since
labor is inelastic, lt = 1/nt. We then replace consumption with the feasibility constraint
Ct = Yt − nt [fe + µG (ε?t )] and use the default threshold wt = 1rt (ε?t )
θ [∆ (0)]1−θ n(1−θ)/θt to
determine wages. The problem reduces to,
max
nt,rt
Ct = n
(1−θ)/θ
t ∆(0)− nt [fe + κG (ε?t )]
+λ1,t
(ε?t )θ
[∫ ∞
ε?t
dG (ε) +
∫ ε?t
0
(
ε
ε?t
)θ
dG (ε)− r
d
t
rt
][
∆ (0)
n
1/θ
t
]1−θ
− κntG (ε?t )

It is immediate that λ1,t = 0 by the choice of rt. We discuss this reduced problem with
λ1,t = 0 in the text.
34
Appendix A.4. (Proof of Proposition 4)
We suppose that there is aggregate uncertainty. The instantaneous profit function of the
firm is written as,
pit (εt, at) = ε
θ
t ×
[
n1/θ∆(0)lt
]1−θ
at [lt(i)]
θ − wtrt [lt(i) + fo] (35)
where ε?t = ε
? (at) and rt = r (at). For any particular at, we can compute pit (at), defined as
pit (ε
?
t , at) = Eεtpit (at), for all i. We write the constrained optimization problem of the firm
as,
max
lt(i)
pit (at) =
∫ ∞
ε?t
{
εθt ×
[
ltn
1/θ
t ∆(0)
]1−θ
atl
θ
t − wtrt (lt + fo)
}
dG(ε) (36)
subject to the threshold equation, pit (ε
?
t ) = 0. Define the Hamiltonian as,
H(lt, ε?t , rt, at) = pit (lt, ε?t , rt, at) + λt × f (lt, ε?t , rt, at) (37)
where λt (·) is the lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint. The Hamiltonian is at
its maximum on average with respect to {rt, ε?t} for any {at, lt}, and so,
∫
at
∂
∂ε?t
H(t) = 0 and∫
at
∂
∂lt
H(t) = 0. As ∂
∂ε?t
pi (t) = 0, the lagrange multiplier is zero and λ (t) = 0. Applying the
equilibrium condition, lt = lt, and we arrive at:
∂H (t)
∂lt
=
∫ ∞
ε?t
{
θεθt ×
[
n
1/θ
t ∆(0)
]1−θ
at
}
dG(εt)− [1−G (ε?t )]wtrt = 0 (38)
In order to proceed we need functional expressions for ε?(at) and r(at); the former is de-
termined by the zero-profit default threshold condition and the latter by the zero-profit
condition for financial intermediaries. Using the equation that determines ε?t , we derive,
Et
∫ ∞
ε?t
[
θatε
θ
t − at(ε?t )θ
(
lt
lt + fo
)]
dG(ε) = 0 (39)
We can easily relate this expression to f (ε?t , σ) = θ
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG(ε) − [1−G (ε?t )] (ε?t )θ = 0 as
reported in Proposition 1 once we set fo = 0 and eliminate aggregate productivity shocks.
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Appendix B
In this Appendix we detail the Ramsey policy problem and derive the first-order conditions
for optimal policy in the dynamic model.
Appendix B.1 (Derivation of the Present Value Constraint)
Recall that the household budget constraint - given by equation (18) in the text. We
first multiply this constraint by the marginal utility of consumption, uC(t), impose the
equilibrium condition xt−1 = 1, and integrate forward. We then use the labour supply
and the dynamic Euler equations, uC(t) = βEt
[
uC(t+ 1)r
j
t
]
; uC(t) = βEt
[
uC(t+ 1)r
d
t
]
and
vtuC(t) = β(1 − δ)Et
[
z(ε?t+1)uC(t+ 1)
]
. Finally, we use dynamic equation for product
creation, nt = (1− δ) (nt−1 + ne,t−1), to write the present value constraint as,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [uC(t)Ct + uL(t)Lt] = A (40)
where A ≡ uC(0)
[
rd−1d−1 + b0 + n0z(ε
?
0)
]
is assumed exogenous.
Appendix B.2 (Definition of the Ramsey Problem)
Following Chugh and Ghironi (2015), the Ramsey policy maker picks τLt and commits to pick
τ dt+1 in period t. The problem can be written as one of maximizing E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(Ct, Lt), sub-
ject to all the conditions presented in Table 1, the present value constraint, given by equation
(40), and a constraint that ε?t > 0. Plans are made over {ne,t, nt+1, lt, Ct, Lt, pi (ε?t )}∞t=0, prices{
wt, rt, r
d
t−1
}∞
t=0
, tax rates,
{
τ dt+1, τ
L
t
}∞
t=0
and the default threshold, {ε?t}∞t=0. By choosing
tax rates, however, the constraints on the labor-leisure and the Euler equation for shares
(i.e., product creation) do not bind. Similarly, by picking wages and interest rates directly,
the constraints on firm pricing, the zero profit condition for financial intermediaries, and the
Euler equation for deposits do not bind. This allows us to re-write the reduced Ramsey
policy problem as in the text where ε?t > 0.
36
Appendix B.3 (Optimality Conditions for the Ramsey Problem)
Consider the Ramsey problem defined in the text.
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct, Lt) + β
tλ1,t {ρt [∆(0)× at] ltnt − Ct − fene,t −G− κntG (ε?t )}
+βtλ2,t [Lt − nt (lt + fo)] + βtλ3,t [(1− δ) (nt + ne,t)− nt+1]
+βtλ4,t
{
θ
∫ ∞
ε?t
εθdG (ε) at (lt + fo)− (ε?t )θ × atlt [1−G (ε?t )]
}
+ξ
{
A0 − E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [uC(t)Ct + uL(t)Lt]
}
Differentiating with respect to ε?t , we find,
0 = λ4at
{
[(1− θ)lt − θfc] (ε?t )θ g (ε?t )− θlt (ε?t )θ−1 [1−G (ε?t )]
}
− λ1,t [κntg (ε?t )] (41)
where λ1,t the lagrange multiplier associated with the resources (output) equation.
42 It is
clear from this expression that λ4,t > 0. The remaining first-order conditions (obtained
from simply differentiating with respect to {ne,t, nt+1, lt, Ct, Lt}) are,
λ1,tfe = (1− δ)λ3,t (42)(
β
θ
)
Et
(
λ1,t+1
Yt+1
nt+1
)
− βEt
(
λ2,t+1
Lt+1
nt+1
)
= λ3,t − β (1− δ)Etλ3,t+1 (43)
0 = λ1,tEt
(
Yt
lt
)
− λ2,tEtnt + λ4,t fo
(lt + fo)
2Et
∫ ∞
ε?(at)
{
at [ε
?(at)]
θ
}
dG(ε) (44)
λ1,t = uC (t)
{
1 + ξ
[
1 +
uCC(t)Ct
uC (t)
]}
; − λ2,t = uL (t)
{
1 + ξ
[
1 +
uLL(t)Lt
uL (t)
]}
(45)
where ρt = n
(1−θ)/θ
t . Without aggregate uncertainty, we have ... + λ4,t
{
θ −
[
ε?t
∆(ε?t )
]θ}
in
equation (44).
42Note that, without uncertainty, we can show the final term in this expression is equal to
λ4,tltEt
[
ε?t
∆(ε?t )
]θ
θ (∆ε? − 1), where ∆ε? ≡ ε? [∆′ (ε?) /∆ (ε?)] < 1.
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Table 1: Model Summary
Description Equation
Labor Clearing and Production Lt = nt (lt + fo) and Yt = n
1/θ
t [∆(0)× at] lt
Resources Yt −G = Ct + fene,t + κntG (ε?t )
Labor demand Et
∫∞
ε?t
[
θatε
θ
t − at (ε?t )θ
(
lt
lt+fo
)]
dG(ε) = 0
Labor supply wt = − uL(t)(1−τLt )EtuC(t)
Net worth zt = (1− τt)D (ε?t ) pit + vt
Expected profit pit = n
(1−θ)/θ
t [∆(0)× at] [(1− θ) lt − θfo]
Mass of firms nt+1 = (1− δ) (nt + ne,t)
Default threshold (ε?t )
θ ×
[
n
1/θ
t ∆(0)
]1−θ
atlt − wtrt (lt + fo) = 0
Financial intermediaries wt (lt + fo) r
d
t−1 + κG (ε
?
t ) =
[
1−G (ε?t ) + ηt(ε?t )θ
]
(lt + fo)wtrt
Euler Equation (shares) and Entry fe = β(1− δ)Et
[
uC(t+1)
uC(t)
]
zt+1
Euler Equation (deposits and bonds) 1 = βEt
[
uC(t+1)
uC(t)
]
rdt
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Table 2: Exogenous Parameters and Calibration
Parameters Set Exogenously
Statistic Parameter Value Target/Source
Firm exit rate δ 0.1 10%
Markup θ 0.74 Bernard et al. (2003)
Discount factor β 0.98 2% risk-free rate
Frisch elasticity υ
(
1−L
L
)
0.72 Heathcote et al. (2010)
Sunk cost fe 1 Normalization
Calibrated Parameters
Statistic Parameter Value Target Source
Volatility (long-run) σ 0.135 - Comin and Mulani (2006)
Interest rate spread κ 2.84 160 b.p. BBB-Treasury spread
Default rate fo 0.116 1% Giesecke et al. (2011)
Hours worked χ 1.341 20% -
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Volatility Shock
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock
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Figure 3: Tax Responses to a Volatility and Productivity Shock
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